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This paper presents an equilibrium model for the demand and supply of liquidity and its impact on
asset prices and welfare. We show that when constant market presence is costly, purely idiosyncratic
shocks lead to endogenous demand of liquidity and large price deviations from fundamentals. Moreover,
market forces fail to lead to efficient supply of liquidity, which calls for potential policy interventions.
However, we demonstrate that different policy tools can yield different efficiency consequences. For
example, lowering the cost of supplying liquidity on the spot (e.g., through direct injection of liquidity
or relaxation of ex post margin constraints) can decrease welfare while forcing more liquidity supply
(e.g., through coordination of market participants) can improve welfare.
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Liquidity is of critical importance to the stability and the e±ciency of ¯nancial markets. The lack of
it has often been blamed for exacerbating market crises such as the 1987 stock market crash, the 1998
near collapse of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) and the current upheaval
in the credit market.1 Yet there is much less consensus about exactly what market liquidity is, what
determines it, and how it a®ects asset prices and welfare. Views become even more divergent when it
comes to appropriate policies with respect to liquidity, such as lowering barriers of entry in securities
trading, setting margin and capital requirements for broker-dealers, coordinating market participants
and supplying liquidity during crises. The ongoing debate on the interventions by the central banks
and the U.S. Treasury to inject liquidity into the market during the current credit market crisis is
an excellent case in point. The purpose of this paper is to present a simple theoretical framework to
facilitate the discussions on these issues.
We start with the observation that the lack of full participation in a market is at the heart of
illiquidity. Imagine a situation in which all potential buyers and sellers are constantly present in the
market and can trade without constraints and frictions, i.e., fully participate. Then all agents face
the full demand/supply at all times and security prices will depend only on the fundamentals such
as payo®s and preferences. To the extent that illiquidity re°ects forces beyond these fundamentals,
a market with full participation can be considered as perfectly liquid. Thus, illiquidity only arises
when frictions prevent full participation of all agents.
To capture this notion of illiquidity in a simple way, we assume that agents face participation
costs that prevent them from constant, active and unfettered participation in the market. We then
develop an equilibrium model of both liquidity demand and supply in the presence of such costs.
The endogenous demand for liquidity arises when participation costs prevent potential buyers and
sellers with matching trading needs from coordinating their trades. The same costs also hinder
the supply of liquidity. As a result, purely idiosyncratic shocks can cause infrequent but large
deviations in prices from the fundamentals. Moreover, we show that in general, market forces fail
to achieve e±cient supply of liquidity. However, di®erent policy interventions can lead to divergent
consequences. For example, direct injection of liquidity when it is in shortage can actually reduce
welfare, while coordinated supply of liquidity by market participants can improve welfare. We also
show that di®erent costs of market presence give rise to distinctively di®erent market structures
and price/volume behavior, and the welfare consequences of the same policy interventions heavily
1See the report by the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms (Brady and et al. (1988)), the review by
the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS (1999)), and the report by the International Monetary Fund
(GFSR (2008)) for events in 1987, 1998, and 2007, respectively.
1depends on the structure of the market.
To model the need for and the provision of liquidity in a uni¯ed framework, we start with
an economy in which agents face both idiosyncratic and aggregate risks. It is the desire to share
the idiosyncratic risks that gives rise to their need to trade in the asset market. By de¯nition,
idiosyncratic risks sum to zero across all agents. Thus, underlying trading needs are always perfectly
matched among agents.
When market presence is costless, all agents will stay in the market at all times. The market price
adjusts to coordinate all buyers and sellers. In particular, buy and sell orders, driven by idiosyncratic
risks, are always in balance. In this case, asset prices are fully determined by the fundamentals, in
particular the level of aggregate risk, and are independent of agents' idiosyncratic trading needs.
When market presence is costly, however, not all agents are in the market at all times. An agent
can incur an ex ante cost to be a market maker and then trades constantly, or pay a spot cost to trade
after observing their trading needs. Such a cost structure is motivated by the market structure we
observe: a subset of agents|such as dealers, trading desks, and hedge funds|maintain a constant
market presence and act as market makers, while most agents|such as the majority of individual
and institutional investors, whom we refer to as traders|only enter the market when they need to
trade. By the cost of market presence we intend to capture not only the costs of being in the market,
but also any costs associated with raising needed capital or adjusting existing positions, in other
words, any costs or hurdles that prevent the free °ow of capital in the market.
As they trade only infrequently, traders are forced to bear certain idiosyncratic risk. This extra
risk makes them less risk tolerant and less willing to hold their share of the aggregate risk. For
traders receiving an additional idiosyncratic risk in the same direction as the aggregate risk, they
are farther away from their desired position and thus are more eager to trade. Consequently, more
of them will enter the market than those with the opposite idiosyncratic risk (which partially o®sets
their exposure to the aggregate risk). Thus, despite perfectly matching trading needs, traders fail to
coordinate their trades, leading to order imbalances.
The endogenous order imbalances exhibit several distinctive properties. First, it is always in the
same direction as the impact of the aggregate risk on asset demand, as traders with higher than
average risk are more likely to enter the market. Second, order imbalances are always of signi¯cant
magnitudes when they occur. This is simply because for small idiosyncratic shocks, gains from
trading are small and all traders choose to stay out of the market. It is only with su±ciently large
idiosyncratic shocks that gains from trading exceed participation costs for some traders, leading to
the mismatch in their trades. The resulting order imbalance will also be large. Third, the magnitude
of possible order imbalances depends on the level of the aggregate risk, which a®ects the asymmetry
2in trading gains between di®erent traders.
By endogenizing the order imbalance, we are able to characterize the impact of liquidity on asset
prices. In particular, purely idiosyncratic shocks can generate aggregate liquidity needs and cause
price to deviate from its fundamental value. Moreover, the impact of liquidity on price is in the same
direction as that of the aggregate risk and is of signi¯cant magnitudes. Consequently, it leads to
higher price volatility and fat tails.
Under exogenous liquidity demand, Grossman and Miller (1988) ¯nd that higher costs of market
making lead to lower levels of liquidity in the market and more volatile prices. We show that, when
liquidity demand is endogenously determined, it becomes interdependent with liquidity supply and
prices are not necessarily more volatile in less liquid markets.
In particular, we obtain two di®erent market structures. Only when the cost of market making
is below a threshold do we have the usual market structure in which liquidity is supplied by mar-
ket makers. When the cost of market making exceeds this threshold, a di®erent market structure
emerges|there will be no market makers in the market and all liquidity is supplied by traders them-
selves on the spot. Under such a market structure, the liquidity supply is extremely low but so is the
observed need for liquidity|traders choose to stay out of the market most of the time. They only
enter when shocks are large and participation is su±ciently symmetric. In this case, prices actually
become less volatile. In such a market, conventional measures of price impact fails to be informative
about liquidity. Instead, the lack of trading volume properly reveals the low level of liquidity. Thus,
our results also provide a theoretical justi¯cation for incorporating trading volume into measures of
market liquidity.2
In our model, trading and liquidity provision generate externalities. A trader's participation in
the market also bene¯ts his potential counter-parties while a market maker's supply of liquidity helps
all potential traders. We show that in general market mechanism fails to properly internalize these
externalities and thus leads to ine±cient supply of liquidity in the market. Such an ine±ciency leaves
room for policy interventions. However, given the endogenous nature of both liquidity demand and
supply, we demonstrate that di®erent policy choices can lead to surprising consequences. We show
that it is possible to improve overall welfare of the economy by simply forcing all agents to pay the
cost and participate in the market. In this case, the extra liquidity generated by broad participation
yields bene¯ts for all agents, which can outweigh the extra costs they pay. We also show that in
a market with insu±cient liquidity supply, decreasing participation costs, in particular, the cost to
enter the market on the spot, can actually reduce welfare. This is because lowering the cost to enter
2For empirical evidence on the role of volume in measuring liquidity, see, for example, Campbell, Grossman, and
Wang (1993), Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Amihud (2002).
3the market on the spot reduces the incentive to be in the market a priori, i.e., to become a market
maker. The level of liquidity in the market will then decrease, which hurts everyone, including those
who now pay lower costs.
During market crises, such as the 1998 LTCM debacle and the current credit market upheaval,
central banks have resorted to relaxing their lending conditions, e.g., by cutting the rates charged
and broadening the collateral accepted, in order to increase liquidity into the market. This can be
interpreted as cutting the cost of spot market participation in our model. Government agencies, such
as the New York Federal Reserve Band in the case of LTCM crisis and the U.S. Treasury in the case
of current credit market crisis, have also coordinated market participants to collectively supply pools
of liquidity. Such an action is related to the forced spot participation in our analysis. Similarly,
regulations such as designated market makers and high capital requirements can be interpreted as
forced ex ante participation in our model. Our analysis shows that an equilibrium setting with both
endogenous demand and supply of liquidity allows us to identify the sources of market ine±ciencies
and examine the tradeo®s of a particular policy tool and its overall welfare implications under
di®erent circumstances.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. Section 3 solves for the
intertemporal equilibrium of the economy. In Section 4, we examine how the need for liquidity
a®ects asset prices and trading volume. Section 5 describes the endogenous determination of liquidity
provision in the market and how it in°uences prices and volume. In Section 6, we consider the welfare
implications of liquidity need and provision. Section 7 further explores the policy implications of our
analysis. Section 8 gives a more detailed discussion on the related literature and Section 9 concludes.
The appendix contains all the proofs.
2 The Model
We construct a simple model that captures two important elements in analyzing liquidity, the need
to trade and the cost to trade. We will be parsimonious in the description of the model and return
at the end of this section to provide more discussion of the model, especially motivations for its
di®erent components.
A. Securities Market
The economy has three dates, 0, 1 and 2. There is a competitive securities market, which consists
of two securities, a riskless bond, which is also used as the numeraire, and a risky stock. The bond
yields a sure payo® of 1 at date 2. The stock yields a risky dividend D at date 2, which has a mean
of zero and a volatility of ¾.
4B. Agents
There is a continuum of agents of measure 1 with identical preferences and zero initial holdings of the
traded securities. Each agent i receives a non-traded payo® Ni at date 2, which is correlated with
the payo® of the stock. Depending on their non-traded payo®, agents fall into two equally populated
groups, denoted by a and b. All agents in group i, i = a;b, receive the same non-traded payo®
Ni = Y iu (1)
where Y a and Y b have the same distribution and are independent of u. For simplicity, we use i to
refer to both an individual agent as well as agents in group i where i = a;b.





Let Y ´ 1
2(Y a+Y b) and Z ´ 1
2(Y a¡Y b). We can rewrite each agent's non-traded payo® as follows:
Ni = (Y + ¸iZ)u (2)
where ¸a = 1, ¸b = ¡1 and Y , Z are uncorrelated.3 Thus, Y gives the aggregate exposure to
the non-traded risk and ¸iZ gives the idiosyncratic exposure. By de¯nition, agents' idiosyncratic
exposures sum to zero. For simplicity, we assume that Y , Z and u are jointly normal with zero mean
and volatility of ¾Y, ¾Z and ¾u, respectively. In addition, we let u = D.4
Agents ¯rst receive information about their non-traded payo® at date 1. In particular, they
observe Y , ¸i and a signal S about Z:
S = Z + " (3)
where " is a noise in the signal, normally distributed with a volatility of ¾" > 0.
In the absence of idiosyncratic risks (i.e., when Z = 0), all agents are identical and they have
no trading needs. In the presence of idiosyncratic risks (i.e., when Z 6= 0), however, agents want to
share these risks. In particular, given the correlation between the non-traded payo® and the stock
payo®, they want to adjust their stock positions in order to hedge their non-traded risk. Thus,
agents' idiosyncratic risks give rise to their trading needs.
An agent's preference is described by an expected utility function over his terminal wealth. For
tractability, we assume that he exhibits constant absolute risk aversion. In particular, agent i has
3Since Y
a and Y








4We only need the correlation between u and D to be non-zero. The qualitative nature of our results are independent
of the sign and the magnitude of the correlation. To ¯x ideas, we set it to 1.
5the following utility function:
¡e¡®Wi
(4)
where Wi denotes his terminal wealth and ® is the absolute risk aversion. We further require
®2¾2(¾2
Y +¾2
Z) < 1 (5)
to guarantee a bounded expected utility in the presence of non-traded payo®s.
C. Participation Costs
At date 0, all agents are identical and thus need not trade. For simplicity, we allow them to trade in
the market at no cost. Agents' trading needs arise at date 1 after they observe their risk exposures
(Y , ¸i and S). In order to trade at date 1, an agent has to pay a cost. He can either pay a cost
cm at date 0 before learning about his own trading needs, which allows him to trade at any time, or
wait until after observing his shocks and pay a cost c to trade in the market if he chooses.
Those who pay the ex ante cost will be in the market at all times, ready to trade with others.
We call them \market makers," denoted by m. Those who only pay the spot cost when they trade
are called traders, denoted by n. Traders will demand liquidity when they cannot meet their own
trading needs and market makers provide it in these circumstances. In actual markets, institutional
or individual investors usually behave as traders in our model while dealers and hedge funds serve
as market makers. By explicitly modeling the choice of becoming a trader or a market maker, we
fully endogenize the need for liquidity as well as its supply. This allows us to examine the pricing
and welfare implications of liquidity in a full equilibrium setting.
D. Time Line
For the economy de¯ned above, we now detail the sequence of events, agents' actions, and the
corresponding equilibrium. At date 0, agents ¯rst trade in the market to establish their initial
position µi
0 and the equilibrium stock price P0. Given that they are identical, the equilibrium is
reached at µi
0 = 0.
Each agent then decides if he wants to pay the cost cm to become a market maker. Let ´i
m denote
his choice, with ´i
m = 1 for being a market maker and ´i
m = 0 for not. A participation equilibrium
determines the fraction of agents who become market makers, which we denote by ¹.
At date 1, agents learn about their non-traded risks, and decide whether to pay a cost c to enter
the market to trade. Let ´i denote the entry choice of agent i, with ´i = 1 for entry and ´i = 0 for
no entry. Since market makers are already in the market, they need not pay c. That is, ´i = 0 for
all market makers. For traders, this entry decision depends on their draw of ¸i, the signal S on the
6magnitude of the idiosyncratic risk, as well as the aggregate risk Y . The participation equilibrium
of traders at date 1 determines the fraction of each group that chooses to enter the market, which
we denote by ! ´ f!a;!bg.
After the traders' participation decisions, all market makers and participating traders trade in the
market to choose their stock holdings. Let µi
1(´i
m;´i) denote the stock shares held by a group-i agent
(whose participation decisions are ´i
m and ´i, respectively) after trading at date 1. Hence, µi
1(1;0)
denotes the holding of a group-i market maker and µi
1(0;1) denotes the holding of a participating
group-i trader. For the non-participating traders, ´i
m = ´i = 0 and µi
1(0;0) = µi
0 = 0. The trading
among the market makers and the participating traders determines the market equilibrium at date
1 and the stock price P1. For simplicity, we assume that agents actually observe Z when they trade
after the participation decisions at date 1. Thus, there is no more need to trade afterwards.5
Given his participation decisions ´i
m and ´i and his stock holding µi
1(´i
m;´i) at date 1, agent i's
terminal wealth Wi is given by
Wi = ¡´i
mcm ¡ ´ic + µi
1 (D¡P1) + Ni (6)
where Ni is his non-traded payo® given in (2).
Summarizing the description above, Figure 1 illustrates the time line of the economy.
-
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Figure 1: The time line of the economy.
E. Discussions of the Model
In this subsection, we provide additional discussions and motivations about several important fea-
tures of the model. The two key ingredients of the model are the need to trade and the cost to trade
in the market. Little justi¯cation is necessary for modeling agents' trading needs, given the large
trading volume observed in the market. In order to model trading needs, we must allow for certain
forms of heterogeneity among agents. For example, trading can arise from heterogeneity in endow-
ments (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) and Wang (1994)), preferences (e.g., Dumas (1992) and
Wang (1996)), or beliefs (e.g., Harris and Raviv (1993) and Detemple and Murthy (1994)). Our
5Alternatively, we can assume that Z is realized at date 2 and our results remain qualitatively the same but the
solution becomes more tedious.
7modeling choice of heterogeneity in agents' endowments in the form of non-traded payo®s is mainly
for tractability. Agents thus trade for risk-sharing motives. Our main results are not sensitive to
this particular choice.
Another key component of our model is the cost to participate in the market. This cost is
intended to capture in a reduced form manner any frictions that prevent agents from constant,
active, and unfettered participation in the market. The lack of such a full participation is at the
heart of illiquidity and distinguishes it from other fundamentals.
There is an extensive literature on the nature of these costs and its signi¯cance. For example,
Merton (1987) points out that most agents are prevented from active market presence due to costs of
gathering and processing information, devising trading strategies and support systems, and raising
capital.6 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that, even for agents who are actively participating in
the market, capital constraints often limit their abilities to take on large positions.7 For instance,
typical market makers such as trading desks and hedge funds all have limited capital, which is costly
and time-consuming to raise but hard to maintain in needy times; most institutional investors face
external and internal constraints such as regulations and risk controls, which limit their °exibility
in choosing asset allocations and risk budgets. Thus, the participation cost in our model should be
interpreted broadly as costs or hurdles that hinder the free °ow of capital in the market place, in
addition to the direct costs of physical presence and information processing.
Mounting empirical evidence suggests that these costs not only exist but can be substantial. For
example, Coval and Sta®ord (2007) ¯nd that selling by ¯nancially distressed mutual funds leads to
signi¯cantly depressed prices for the stocks sold, which persist over multiple quarters before recov-
ery. This e®ect occurs despite the fact that these stocks are widely held by other mutual funds who
are not su®ering out°ows. Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007) examine several markets such as
convertible bonds and mergers and acquisitions, in which hedge funds actively pursue pricing anoma-
lies. They show that when hedge funds in a particular market face large redemptions, prices deviate
signi¯cantly from the fundamentals. Capital returns only slowly, leaving the price deviations persist
for long periods of time. The documented persistence of large price deviations caused by liquidity
events implies that signi¯cant costs exist in preventing instantaneous capital °ow or participation.8
In our model, we further recognize that in an intertemporal setting, the magnitude of participation
6See also Brennan (1975), Hirshleifer (1988), Leland and Rubinstein (1988), and Chatterjee and Corbae (1992).
7See also Kyle and Xiong (2001), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008), among others,
for the impact of capital constraints on liquidity supply and asset prices.
8The evidence on the limited mobility of capital is quite extensive. See, for example, Harris and Gurel (1986) and
Shleifer (1986) on the price e®ect of stock deletions from the S&P index, Frazzini and Lamont (2007) on the price
impact of capital °ows to mutual funds, and Tremont (2006) on market behavior and hedge fund °ows.
8costs also depends on the time scale over which agents establish market presence. For costs of the
same nature, e.g., costs of gathering and processing information or raising capital, they can be
substantially higher when less time is allowed. If we interpret c and cm in the model as these same
costs of participation, paid on the spot and ex ante, respectively, it is reasonable to assume that c is
higher than cm.
If, however, the nature of the ex ante and spot costs are di®erent, cm can be higher than c. For
example, if cm is the cost to set up operations to become a market maker while c is merely the cost
of occasional trading, then we would expect cm to be much higher than c. In this case, however, the
market maker expects to trade many times down the road. He has to weigh the total cost cm with
the total bene¯t from all his future trades. For a trader, he weighs the cost c for each of his trade.
If a market maker trades frequently, as he should, on a per trade basis, his cost should be lower.9
Since our model has only one trading cycle, the costs cm and c should be interpreted as costs for
each trade. Thus, we expect cm < c.
We also note that our use of the term \market makers" is broader than its most common use. In
addition to designated dealers in a market, we also include agents who maintain an active presence
in the market and provide liquidity as market makers such as trading desks and hedge funds.
It is well recognized that more capital in a market tends to reduce the risk aversion of marginal
investors (e.g., Grossman and Vila (1992)) and thus improves the supply of liquidity. In our setting,
all agents have constant risk aversion and the amount of capital each of them has does not matter.
But the participation of more agents brings in more capital and lowers the e®ective risk aversion of
market makers as a group (which is their average risk aversion divided by the total number of them).
In this sense, the number of market makers in our model is e®ectively playing the same role as the
amount of total capital in the market.
In addition, the assumption that Z is not fully observed at the time of participation decision
is important in our model. It implies that agents do not anticipate to trade away all their future
idiosyncratic risks if they participate. As shown in Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2004), in a fully
intertemporal setting, agents always expect to bear certain idiosyncratic risks since they only trade
infrequently. By assuming partial information on Z when deciding on participation, we capture this
dynamic aspect in a simple setting. Otherwise, the model becomes e®ectively static. As long as Z
is realized after the participation decision, the exact timing of its revelation is unimportant.
9Otherwise potential market makers are strictly better o® trading only on the spot and no one would choose to
become a market maker.
93 Equilibrium
We solve for the equilibrium in three steps. First, taking as a given agents' initial stock holdings
µi
0, the fraction ¹ of market makers, and the participation decision of traders, we solve for the stock
market equilibrium at date 1. Next, we solve for individual traders' participation decisions and the
participation equilibrium, given the market equilibrium at 1. Finally, we solve for individual agents'
decision to become market makers and their equilibrium population ¹ as well as the stock market
equilibrium at date 0.
3.1 Equilibrium with Costless Participation
We start with the special case of no participation costs, i.e., cm = c = 0. This case serves as a
benchmark when we examine the impact of participation costs on liquidity and market behavior.
In this case, agents are indi®erent between being market makers or traders, i.e., any ¹ 2 [0;1] is
an equilibrium. They will be in the market at all times, i.e., !a = !b = 1. The equilibrium price
and agents' equilibrium stock holdings are:
P0 = 0; µi
0 = 0
P1 = ¡®¾2 Y; µi
1 = ¡¸iZ
(7)
where i = a;b.
The initial price of the stock is P0 = 0 because its expected dividend is normalized to zero and
it is in zero net supply. Since the non-traded payo® is perfectly correlated with the stock payo®, the
aggregate (per capita) risk exposure Y is equivalent to an aggregate supply shock for the stock, and
thus a®ects its price at date 1. The aggregate risk, however, does not a®ect agents' share holdings
in equilibrium.
Their idiosyncratic risk exposure ¸iZ, on the other hand, a®ects individual holdings. In par-
ticular, agents' stock holdings are given by ¡¸iZ, which re°ects their hedging demand to o®set
their idiosyncratic risk exposure. Because agents' underlying trading needs are perfectly matched
(¸a = ¡¸b), so are their trades when they are all in the market. In this case, there is no need for
liquidity. The market is perfectly liquid in the sense that trading has no price impact. Stock prices
do not depend on the idiosyncratic shock Z.
3.2 Stock Market Equilibrium at Date 1
We now present equilibrium with participation costs, starting with the market equilibrium at date 1.
Assume a population ¹ of agents becomes market makers. The remaining population 1¡¹ is evenly
split between group-a and -b traders, with ! = f!a;!bg fraction of each trader group participating.











; for ¹ > 0 or ! > 0
¸i; for ¹ = ! = 0.
(8)
as a measure of asymmetry in participation between the two groups of traders. When ¹ > 0 or
! > 0, the numerator gives the net population imbalance between the two trader groups and the
denominator is the total population in the market. When ¹ = ! = 0, there is no agent in the market
other than the agent under consideration (in group i), and ± is de¯ned as the limiting ratio when





gives the maximum amount of participation asymmetry between the two trader groups.
Taking ¹ and ± as given, we solve the market equilibrium at date 1, which is given below:
Proposition 1. The equilibrium stock price at date 1 is
P1 = ¡®¾2 Y ¡ ®¾2 ±Z (10)
and the equilibrium stock holdings of market makers and participating traders are
µi
1 = ±Z ¡ ¸iZ; (11)
where i = a;b.10
Contrasting to the benchmark case when participation is costless and symmetric between the two
trader groups, both individual holding and the equilibrium price now have an extra term related to
±Z. When ± 6= 0, the participation of the two groups of traders is asymmetric. The buy and sell
orders are no long perfectly matched. The order imbalance leads to an additional net risk exposure,
which is ±Z on a per capita basis. All participating agents equally share this risk and increase their
holding by ±Z. The idiosyncratic shock Z now a®ects the equilibrium price as (10) shows. Thus, even
though traders face o®setting shocks, asymmetry in their participation can give rise to a mismatch
in their trades and cause the price to change in response to these shocks.
So far, we have taken traders' participation rate ! and the resulting ± as given. In the next
subsection, we show that when individual participation decisions are made endogenously, asymmetric
participation occurs as an equilibrium outcome.
10When ¹ = ! = 0, there is no agent in the market and the market equilibrium allows a range of prices. Choosing
the speci¯c price in the proposition does not a®ect the overall equilibrium.
113.3 Traders' Optimal Participation Decisions at Date 1
Given the stock market equilibrium at date 1, we now solve the participation equilibrium of traders
in two steps. First, taking as a given the participation decision of other traders, we derive the optimal
participation policy of an individual trader. Next, we ¯nd the competitive equilibrium for traders'
participation decisions.
At the time of their participation decisions, all traders have a stock holding of µi
0 = 0 (i = a;b).
Moreover, they observe Y , ¸i and a signal S on Z. We denote by X the expectation of Z conditional
on signal S, ¾2
X the variance of X, and ¾2
z the variance of Z conditional on S. Then,
X ´ E[ZjS] = ¯S; ¾2
X ´ Var[X] = ¯¾2
Z; ¾2
z ´ Var[ZjS] = (1¡¯)¾2
Z (12)
where ¯ ´ ¾2
Z=(¾2
Z + ¾2
"). Under normality, X is a su±cient statistic for signal S. Thus, we will use
X to denote agents' information about the magnitude of the idiosyncratic risk.
For trader i, let Ji
P and Ji
NP denote his indirect utility function given his decision to participate
(P) or not to participate (NP), respectively. Under constant absolute risk aversion, trader i's indirect
utility function takes the form of J = ¡I(¢)e¡®W, where W is his wealth and I(¢) depends on the
initial stock holding µi
0, market condition ±, and non-traded risk exposure Y , X and ¸i (see Appendix











; i = a;b: (13)
The minus sign on the right-hand side adjusts for the fact that Ji
P and Ji
NP are negative. The following
proposition describes individual traders' optimal participation policy.
Proposition 2. The net gain from participation for trader i is
g(µi
0;Y;X;¸i;±) ´ g1(µi
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(kY +¸iX); k ´ ®2¾2¾2
z: (16)
He participates if and only if g(¢) > 0.11
When ¹ = ! = 0, g(¢) = ¡c < 0 for both traders. Without any agent in the market at date 1, a
11Parameter restriction (5) guarantees that k < 1.
12trader has no one to trade with if he chooses to participate and he will end up with the same stock
position except that he is now c dollars poorer. Hence, he never participates.
When ¹ > 0 or ! > 0, a trader can bene¯t from trading. His net gain from participation consists
of three terms, g1(¢), g2(¢) and ¡c. The ¯rst term, g1(¢), represents the expected trading gain in
response to his current shocks. We can interpret ^ µi as trader i's desired holding after the shocks.
Unless µi
0 = ^ µi, he expects a positive net gain from trading. The second term, g2(¢), captures the
expected trading gain from o®setting future shocks to non-traded risks. This term depends only on
the market condition ± and k, which is proportional to future trading needs as captured by ¾2
z. The
last term, ¡c, re°ects the cost of participation.
For future convenience, we de¯ne
gi(±;Y;X) ´ g(0;Y;X;¸i;±); i = a;b; (17)
by substituting in the initial holding µi
0 = 0. In general, trading gains are asymmetric between the







ln(1¡k) ¡ c (18)
where ^ µi = ¡(kY +¸iX). Clearly, ga 6= gb (except for Y = 0 or X = 0), and ga ¸ gb whenever Y
and X have the same sign.
In order to understand this asymmetry, we ¯rst consider the special case when X = 0. With
zero current idiosyncratic shocks, all agents (market makers and traders) receive equal share of the
aggregate risk. However, given the future idiosyncratic shocks, as represented by Z, traders still
desire to trade. In particular, the prospect of bearing these risks makes them e®ectively more risk
averse. Consequently, they prefer to bear less of the aggregate risk. Their desired position becomes
^ µi = ¡kY , which is di®erent from their initial position µi
0 = 0. Hence, traders would like to sell the
stock to unload k fraction of their exposure to the aggregate risk. This desire is independent of the
realization of the idiosyncratic shock X.
When X 6= 0, the desire to partially unload the aggregate risk is combined with the desire to
unload their idiosyncratic risks. For those traders whose idiosyncratic shock ¸iX is in the same
direction as the aggregate shock Y , their initial position (µi
0 = 0) is further away from their desired
position ^ µi = ¡(kY + ¸iX). For example, when Y and X have the same sign, ^ µa = ¡(kY + X)
is further away from 0 than ^ µb = ¡(kY ¡ X). The gains from trading, which is proportional to
(^ µi)2, is then larger for group-a traders than for group-b traders.12 We thus have the following result:
12It is worth pointing out that in general the gain from trading also depends on the initial position µ
i
0. In a setting
like ours, µ
i
0 is always di®erent from ^ µ
i since the latter depends on the current shocks while the former does not. In
a stationary setting similar to ours, Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2004) show that the gain from trading is asymmetric
13When participation in the market is costly, the gains from trading are in general asymmetric between
traders with perfectly matching trading needs. In addition, the gains are larger for those traders
with idiosyncratic shocks in the same direction as the aggregate shock.
We shall emphasize that the asymmetry in trading gains is a general phenomenon. To see this,
let u(µ) denote the utility from holding µ and µ¤ be the optimal holding. Then, u0(µ¤) = 0. For
a small deviation x = µ¡µ¤ from the optimum, we can drop the higher order terms from the
Taylor expansion and obtain the gain from trading as u(µ¤) ¡ u(µ¤+x) ' ¡u00(µ¤)x2=2, which is
the same for an opposite deviation ¡x. When trading is costless, traders constantly maintain the
optimal position, and the gains from trading for traders with small o®setting shocks are always the
same. This symmetry breaks down when trading is costly. Facing a cost, traders no longer trade
constantly. They only trade when the deviation from the optimal is su±ciently large. As Figure
2 illustrates, the trading gain is no longer symmetric for ¯nite deviations from the optimum since
u(µ¤) ¡ u(µ¤+x) 6= u(µ¤) ¡ u(µ¤¡x) for a ¯nite x. Hence, as long as trading is infrequent, the gains





Figure 2: Asymmetry in utility gain from costly trading.
The result that trading gains are larger for traders receiving more (than average) risks is also
fairly robust. It only requires traders to become e®ectively more risk-averse when faced with un-
hedged idiosyncratic risks. As Kimball (1993) shows, all preferences with \standard risk aversion"
exhibit such a behavior.13
3.4 Participation Equilibrium for Traders at Date 1
Given the asymmetric participation decisions of the two groups of traders, we show in the following
proposition that the participation equilibrium is also asymmetric.
around the optimal holding due to the fact that traders only trade infrequently.
13Standard risk aversion is de¯ned as the class of utility functions that exhibit both decreasing absolute risk aversion
(DARA) and decreasing absolute prudence. In our setting, the underlying utility function, with constant absolute risk
aversion, does not exhibit standard risk aversion, but the indirect utility function, i.e., the value function does.
14Proposition 3. A participation equilibrium for traders exists. When Y and X have the same sign,
the equilibrium (!a;!b) is given by
A. For gb(0;Y;X) · ga(0;Y;X) · 0, !a = !b = 0;
B. For ga(0;Y;X) ¸ gb(0;Y;X) ¸ 0, !a = !b = 1;
C. Otherwise, either !a = 1 and !b 2 [0;1) or !a 2 (0;1) and !b = 0, and !a > !b,
When Y and X have opposite signs, the equilibrium (!a;!b) is given by exchanging subscripts a
and b in A-C. Moreover, the above equilibrium is unique when ¹>0. When ¹=0, there also exists
an autarky equilibrium with !a = !b = 0 for all Y and X, which is Pareto dominated by the above
equilibrium.
We consider only the non-dominated equilibrium when ¹=0 in future discussions. When X and Y
have the same sign, we know from (18) that group-a traders enjoy larger gains from trading when
the participation is symmetric (± = 0). As a result, in equilibrium there are more group-a traders
entering the market than group-b traders, causing an order imbalance.













A: Ωa = Ωb = 0
B: Ωa = Ωb = 1










Figure 3: Participation equilibrium. Panel (a) illustrates the participation equilibrium in theY > 0 and X > 0
quadrant. The other quadrants can be obtained by symmetry. Region A represents states of no participation
(!
a = !
b = 0); region B represents states of full participation (!
a = !
b = 1); region C represents states with
asymmetric participation (!
a>!
b). Panel (b) illustrates the degree of asymmetry in participation between the
two groups of trades, ±, for di®erent values of Y and X. The market maker population is ¯xed at ¹ = 1=3.
Parameters are set at the following values: ® = 4, ¾ = 0:25, ¾z = 0:7, ¾" = 1:2, ¾Y = 0:7, and c = 0:09.
Figure 3(a) illustrates the states, i.e., realizations of X and Y , for which there is no participation
of traders (Case A in Proposition 3), full participation (Case B), and asymmetric participation (Case
C). For any given level of the aggregate risk, Y , the asymmetric participation occurs for a range of X
with ¯nite values (region C). Figure 3(b) plots ±, the degree of asymmetry in participation between
the two groups of traders, for di®erent values of Y and X. For any given Y , the range of X over
which asymmetry occurs (± 6= 0) in Panel (b) corresponds exactly to the intersection of a horizontal
line at this Y level and region C in Panel (a).
153.5 Participation Equilibrium for Market Makers at Date 0
Up until now, the population of market makers ¹ is taken as given. We now study how it is
determined in equilibrium. Our analysis shows that costly participation gives rise to mismatch in
trades between traders with perfectly matching trading needs. The resulting order imbalance (or
the need for liquidity) thus calls for market makers to supply liquidity. The market makers have
to pay the participation cost ex ante. In return, they bene¯t from supplying liquidity by absorbing
order imbalances in the market at favorable prices. When the bene¯t dominates, agents want to
become market makers. But the bene¯t diminishes as the population of market makers increases
and competition intensi¯es. An equilibrium population of market makers (or an equilibrium level of
liquidity supply) is reached when the cost and bene¯t balance out.
In order to solve for the equilibrium level of liquidity supply, we ¯rst compute the value function of
individual agents who choose to become market makers (Jm) or traders (Jn), for a given population













where the expectation is over the realizations of Y , X, and ¸i, and the indirect utility functions Ji
P
and Ji
NP are de¯ned in Section 3.3.
The participation equilibrium for market makers is reached if one of the following three conditions
is satis¯ed: (i) all agents choose to become market makers, i.e., ¹ = 1 and Jm(1;cm) ¸ Jn(1;c),
(ii) for some ¹ 2 (0;1), agents are indi®erent between being a market maker or a trader, i.e.,
Jm(¹;cm) = Jn(¹;c), and the fraction of agents choosing to become market makers is exactly ¹, or
(iii) no agent chooses to become market makers, i.e., ¹ = 0 and Jm(0;cm) · Jn(0;c). The following
lemma is useful in obtaining the equilibrium population of market makers:
Lemma 1. For any given population of market makers ¹, there exists a unique ·(¹) 2 [0;c] such
that Jm(¹;·) = Jn(¹;c). Moreover, ·(¹) strictly decreases with ¹ for ¹ 2 (¹;1] and remains constant





4k=[(e2®c¡1)(1¡k)] ¡ 1; 1
¾¾
: (20)
The quantity ·(¹) is the break-even cost for an agent to become a market maker, taking as given
the existing population of market makers ¹. The second part of the lemma states that the bene¯t of
becoming a market maker diminishes as the total population of market makers increases, but may
remain constant for su±ciently small ¹.
The participation equilibrium of traders at date 1 is given in the proposition below.
16Proposition 4. Let cm ´ ·(0), cm ´ ·(1), and ·¡1(¢) be the inverse function of ·(¢) de¯ned in
Lemma 1. The equilibrium population of market makers ¹ is determined as follows:
(i) ¹ = 1; if cm < cm
(ii) ¹ = ·¡1(cm) 2 (¹; 1] if cm · cm < cm
(iii) any ¹ 2 [0; ¹]; if cm = cm
(iv) ¹ = 0; if cm > cm:
(21)
Except when cm = cm, the equilibrium is unique. Moreover, as cm approaches cm from below, ¹




, that is, ¹ decreases to 0 at an exponential rate.
Thus, in terms of equilibrium liquidity supply, the market exhibits two distinctive regimes. For
cm < cm, ¹ > 0 and there is a ¯nite amount of liquidity supplied by market makers. For cm ¸ cm,
however, ¹ = 0 and there is zero liquidity supplied by market makers. Moreover, the equilibrium
market making capacity ¹ is not robust at low levels. When ¹ > 0, there is a discrete drop in ¹ from
¹ to 0 as the cost goes from slightly below cm to slightly above. When ¹ = 0, even though there is
no discrete drop, ¹ decreases to 0 at exponential speed for small ¹. In both cases, low levels of ¹
are not sustainable in equilibrium|a slight increase in cm can shift the equilibrium into a state with
no market makers. We will return in Section 5 to discuss in more details the properties of these two
di®erent market regimes.
We conclude the solution of the equilibrium with the following proposition, including the market
equilibrium at date 0:
Proposition 5. When cm<cm, there exists a unique equilibrium in which P0=0, µi
0=0, and ¹>0.
When cm > cm, there exists a stationary equilibrium with P0 = 0, µi
0 = 0, ¹ = 0, and ! > 0. When
cm=cm, there exist multiple equilibria with di®erent values of ¹, which are Pareto equivalent.
3.6 Properties of the Equilibrium
The equilibrium obtained above exhibits several striking features. First, despite the fact that the
two trader groups have perfectly matching trading needs, their actual trades are not matched when
participation in the market is costly. A set of traders may bring their orders to the market while
traders with o®setting trading needs are absent, creating an imbalance of orders and a need for
liquidity. Second, the order imbalance causes the stock price to adjust in order to induce the market
makers to absorb it. As a result, the stock price not only depends on the fundamentals (i.e., its
expected future payo®s and the aggregate risk), but also depends on idiosyncratic shocks market
participants face. Third, the market making capacity, determined endogenously in equilibrium,
17exhibits two distinctive regimes, one at a ¯nite level and another at zero, depending on the costs of
trading and market making. In the following sections, we examine in more detail these results, the
economic mechanism driving them and their welfare implications.
4 Price and Volume
As self-interest fails to coordinate traders' costly participation, perfectly matching trading needs give
rise to unbalanced buy and sell orders. The sign and the magnitude of the order imbalance depend
on the asymmetry in traders' participation ± and their idiosyncratic shock Z. In fact, we can de¯ne
q ´ ¡ ±Z (22)
to be the (normalized) order imbalance at date 1. At the time of participation decision, the ex-
pected order imbalance is E[¡±ZjY;X] = ¡±X, which is mostly determined by ±, the asymmetry in
participation between traders.
The endogenous order imbalance exhibits two interesting properties. First, it is often zero, but
whenever it occurs, it has large magnitudes. For small values of Y and X, which represent most likely
states, the gains from trading are small and no trader enters the market. As stated in Proposition
3 and shown in Figure 3, the order imbalance is zero and there is no need for liquidity. Only for
su±ciently large Y and X do some traders start to participate in the market. Their asymmetric
participation leads to an order imbalance proportional to X, which is also of signi¯cant sizes.
Second, the order imbalance is always in the same direction as the impact of the aggregate shock
on the demand of the stock. For example, when Y > 0, the aggregate non-traded risk is positive,
which is equivalent to an extra endowment of the stock, and the stock demand decreases. From
Proposition 3 and Figure 3, ±X is positive in this case and the expected order imbalance is negative,
further decreasing the demand. The reason that the order imbalance always exacerbates the impact
of the aggregate shock is because traders whose idiosyncratic shock is in the same direction as the
aggregate shock Y always have higher trading gains and are more likely to enter the market. We
thus summarize our main results on the endogenous need of liquidity as follows.
Result 1. The endogenous order imbalance arises in signi¯cant magnitudes when occurs. Moreover,
it is always in the same direction as the impact of aggregate risk on asset demand.
The need for liquidity a®ects prices. From (10), we see that the equilibrium stock price consists
of two components, the \fundamental value," ¡®¾2 Y , and a component driven by liquidity needs,
p ´ ¡®¾2 ±Z (23)
18Naturally, we focus on this liquidity component. As mismatched trades give rise to order imbalances
and the need for liquidity in the market, the stock price has to adjust to attract the market makers
to provide liquidity and to accommodate the order imbalance. It is important to note that the price
deviation p is driven by agents' idiosyncratic shocks and arises only when participation is costly.
For convenience, we consider the expected value of p conditional on Y and X, which we refer
to as the average \liquidity impact on price." From (23), the average liquidity impact is simply
proportional to the expected order imbalance and exhibits the same properties. In particular, it
depends on idiosyncratic shocks and such a dependence is mostly for shocks of ¯nite sizes. These
properties lead to interesting predictions about price and return distributions.
(a) Distribution of p given Y (b) Unconditional distribution of p

















Figure 4: Impact of illiquidity on price. Panel (a) reports the probability distribution of the liquidity impact p,
given di®erent values of the aggregate exposure Y . The solid line is for Y = 1 and the dotted line is for Y = ¡1.
Panel (b) reports the unconditional probability distribution of p. In both panels, the value at p = 0 represents
the total probability mass and at everywhere else represents the probability density. The market maker fraction
is ¯xed at ¹ = 1=3. Parameters are set at the following values: ® = 4, ¾ = 0:25, ¾z = 0:7, ¾" = 1:2, ¾Y = 0:7,
and c = 0:09.
Figure 4(a) plots the probability distribution of the liquidity impact p given a level of aggregate
risk Y and Figure 4(b) plots the unconditional probability distribution of p. The discrete nature of
the liquidity needs gives rise to the high likelihood of large price movements. Note that the liquidity
impact is always zero under costless participation, which corresponds to a probability mass of 1 at
p = 0. Hence, Figures 4(a) and 4(b) clearly demonstrate that prices of the stock can signi¯cantly
deviate away from its fundamental value, leading to additional variability and fat tails in the price.
These deviations are caused by a surge in the liquidity need in the market, which is driven by
idiosyncratic shocks among agents. Thus, we have the following result:
Result 2. The impact of liquidity increases the price volatility of the stock and leads to fat tails in
its returns.
In addition to its impact on price, we can also examine how liquidity a®ects the level of trading














In the absence of participation costs, the volume is simply V = jZj. In the presence of participation
costs, the volume is lower.
An exogenous order imbalance is the starting point for most models of market liquidity such as
those in market microstructure analysis (e.g., Ho and Stoll (1980) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985)).
By studying the need and the supply of liquidity in a uni¯ed framework, we show that the endoge-
nous need for liquidity exhibits distinctive properties, including its highly nonlinear dependence on
idiosyncratic shocks and its correlation with the aggregate risk. These properties lead to interesting
implications on equilibrium prices and volume, which we examine in more detail in the next section.
5 Equilibrium Liquidity
The impact of liquidity needs on asset prices clearly depends on the amount of liquidity available in
the market, which is supplied by market makers. Thus, the population of market makers measures
the ex ante supply of liquidity.14 In our setting, this is determined endogenously. Two factors are
important in determining the equilibrium level of liquidity, the ex ante cost to be a market maker
cm and the spot cost c to jump in the market when needed. The cost c a®ects the potential need
for liquidity and thus the bene¯t to supply liquidity as a market maker. We now consider how these
two factors in°uence the equilibrium level of liquidity.
5.1 Supply of Liquidity
Figure 5 reports the equilibrium population of market makers ¹ as a function of their cost cm,
given traders' participation cost c. Consistent with Proposition 4, when cm is small, i.e., less than
cm = 0:179, all agents choose to become market makers and ¹ = 1. When cm is large, i.e., more
than cm = 0:247, no agent chooses to become a market maker and ¹ = 0. For in-between values of
cm, the fraction of market makers ¹ decreases as cm increases. For the set of parameter values in
the ¯gure, ¹ in (20) is zero. By Proposition 4, there is no discrete change in ¹ as cm approaches
cm. However, in the ¯gure, it appears that the value of ¹ drops from about 0:09 to 0 at cm = 0:247.





14Given the assumption of constant absolute risk aversion, each market maker's investment in the stock is independent
of his wealth. Therefore, their total population also re°ects the amount of capital they put in the stock market.








Figure 5: Equilibrium population of market makers. The ¯gure reports the population of market makers ¹ as a
function of ex ante cost cm. The spot participation cost for traders is set at c = 0:4. Other parameters are set
at the following values: ® = 4, ¾ = 0:25, ¾z = 0:7, ¾" = 1:2, and ¾Y = 0:7.
The drastic decrease in ¹ indicates that low levels of market making capacity is in general not
robust|a slight increase in the cost of supplying liquidity pushes the market into an equilibrium
with no market makers. This result is driven by the externality in ex ante liquidity provision.
As cm increases, there are fewer market makers and traders can only expect to trade more with
each other. This forces the participation decisions of the two groups of traders to become more
correlated and their trades to become better matched. Better matching in their trades reduces
potential order imbalances and further diminishes the need for market makers. Such an interaction
between endogenous liquidity needs and endogenous liquidity provision makes low levels of liquidity
provision (¹ < 0:09 in the above example) unsustainable, as Figure 5 illustrates. We summarize this
result as follows:
Result 3. When both the need and the supply of liquidity are determined endogenously, the level of
ex ante supply of liquidity is not robust at low levels.
Our result contrasts with that of Grossman and Miller (1988), in which the bene¯t for market
makers decreases smoothly with their total population, and the number of market makers decreases
gradually as the cost increases. The di®erence comes from how liquidity needs are modeled. They
take the liquidity need as exogenously given. We model the liquidity need endogenously, together
with the endogenous liquidity supply by the market makers. We show that, as the supply decreases,
the need for liquidity observed in the market also decreases, leading to a low liquidity equilibrium.
5.2 Two Market Structures: Dealer Market and Trader Market
The two regimes, one with market makers (when cm · cm) and the other with no market makers
(when cm >cm), correspond to two di®erent market structures. Since the role of market making is
often acclaimed by dealers, we refer to the market with market makers as a dealer market and that
without market makers as a trader market. We now consider how these two markets behave.
21(a) Price volatility (¾p) (b) Volume (E[V ])












Figure 6: Price volatility and volume. Panel (a) reports the volatility of liquidity component¾p and Panel (b)
reports the average trading volume E[V ] as functions of the ex ante cost cm, respectively. The vertical dotted
lines mark the point of cm = 0:247, above which ¹ = 0. The spot participation cost for traders is set at c = 0:4.
Other parameters are set at the following values: ® = 4, ¾ = 0:25, ¾z = 0:7, ¾" = 1:2, and ¾Y = 0:7.
Figure 6 reports the volatility of the liquidity component in price p and the average trading volume
for di®erent values of cm, both of which exhibit di®erent behavior under the two market structures.
For cm·cm, which equals 0:247, we have the dealer market. Under this market structure, the supply
of liquidity decreases as cm increases, leading to an increase in the price impact, as measured by ¾p,
and a decrease in the trading volume. For cm>cm, we have the trader market, in which traders only
trade among themselves. There is no liquidity supplied by market makers. Since no one chooses to
pay the cost cm, neither the price nor the volume depends on the level of cm. The participation of
traders with o®-setting trading needs can still be asymmetric in some states. The price adjusts in
order to clear the market, giving rise to a positive ¾p. Of course, the bene¯t from participation is
drastically reduced in the absence of market makers, and the average trading volume is very low (at
about 0:007 in the ¯gure).
Comparing the two market structures, we make two additional observations. First, even though
there is a drastic drop in ¹ at cm = cm = 0:247 in Figure 5, there is no discrete change in price
volatility. In fact, the volatility remains constant beyond a threshold level of cm =0:238<cm. The
reason for this result is as follows. When ¹ decreases, a given order imbalance has a larger impact
on price. However, the large price impact also reduces the chance of order imbalances. In particular,
traders with lower trading gains will participate more to act as market makers, while traders with
higher trading gains will reduce their participation in anticipation of the low market making capacity.
Although the equilibrium participation rate of each trader group varies with ¹, the di®erence in their
participation rates, ±, is maintained at a level such that the marginal group is indi®erent between
participating or not. The resulting price impact becomes independent of ¹.
Second, while in the literature higher volatility ¾p due to liquidity shocks is usually associated
with lower liquidity in the market (see, e.g., Kyle (1985)), our analysis shows that it is important
to incorporate volume into the description of liquidity (see, e.g., Amihud (2002)). Although in a
22partial equilibrium analysis, the lack of ex ante liquidity supply usually leads to large price volatility,
our example above clearly indicates that volatility alone can be misleading. While the level of ¾p
remains the same for all costs cm > 0:238, the market structure is di®erent for 0:238 · cm · 0:247
(the dealer market) and cm > 0:247 (the trader market), and so is the level of liquidity. This can be
seen from the gap in the level of trading volume between the two markets. The average volume is
signi¯cantly higher in the dealer market (E[V ] > 0:1) than in the trader market (E[V ] = 0:007). The
reason that ¾p does not necessarily increase as liquidity drops is that traders optimally stay out of
the market most of the time. The need for liquidity that actually arrives at the market can be quite
low given the lack of its ex ante supply.
5.3 Demand of Liquidity
Given the importance of the interaction between the demand and supply of liquidity, we now take
cm as given and examine how the cost of spot participation c a®ects the need for liquidity and the
resulting equilibrium. Figure 7(a) plots the equilibrium level of liquidity ¹ for di®erent values of c.
For small values of c, everyone can jump into the market on the spot at relatively low cost and thus
no one chooses to become a market maker (i.e., ¹ = 0). The equilibrium is a trader market. As c
reaches a critical value of 0:281, the market maker fraction ¹ increases signi¯cantly and the market
becomes a dealer market. It is worth noting that the critical value of the spot participation cost,
0.281, is higher than the cost to become a market maker, which is set to cm = 0:2. The reason for
this di®erence is clear. Spot participation allows agents not to pay the cost in the event of low ex
post trading needs. The value of this option is o®set only when the cost of ex ante participation
is signi¯cantly lower. As c keeps increasing, more agents choose to become market makers (i.e., ¹
increases with c). When c becomes su±ciently high (greater than 0.510), all agents become market
makers and ¹ is always 1.
(a) Equilibrium ¹ (b) Price volatility ¾p (c) Trading volume E[V ]





















Figure 7: Equilibrium and the cost of spot participationc. Panel (a), (b) and (c) report how equilibrium
liquidity supply ¹, price impact of liquidity ¾p and trading volume depend on c, respectively. The vertical
dotted lines mark the point of c = 0:281, below which ¹ = 0. The cost to become a market maker is ¯xed at
cm = 0:2. Other parameters are set at the following values: ® = 4, ¾ = 0:25, ¾z = 0:7, ¾" = 1:2, and ¾Y = 0:7.
23Figure 7(b) demonstrates how the price impact of liquidity, as measured by ¾p, varies with the
spot participation cost. When c · 0:281, we have a trader market (¹ = 0). Surprisingly, even
within this market structure, the price volatility is not monotonic in c. For very small c, all agents
participate, leading to perfectly matched trades and no need for liquidity. Consequently, ¾p = 0.
As c increases, asymmetric participation occurs between traders. The stock price has to adjust in
order to balance the buyers and the sellers. The increasing price volatility re°ects an increase in
participation asymmetry and a need for liquidity. When c increases further, the price volatility ¾p
becomes decreasing with c. It will be misleading, however, to interpret the reduction in ¾p as an
indication of an improving market liquidity. Similar to the result of Figure 6, this is due to the
endogeneity of liquidity needs. An increase in c reduces spot liquidity, which forces traders to enter
the market more symmetrically and reduces the observed need for liquidity. The much steeper drop
in trading volume in Figure 7(c) con¯rms the reduction in market liquidity. We summarize the result
as follows.
Result 4. When the need for liquidity is endogenous, a less liquid market may exhibit lower observed
price impact of liquidity as traders refrain from trading, accompanied by lower trading volume.
When c reaches a critical value, 0.281 in the ¯gure, the market switches to a dealer market (¹ > 0).
As Figure 7(a) indicates, further increase of c encourages more agents to become market makers.
Figure 7(b) and (c) show that the price volatility continues the decreasing trend as the participation
cost increases, while the volume starts to increase with the participation cost. Therefore, both price
volatility and volume re°ect an increasing market liquidity as participation cost increases. The
reason for this counterintuitive result is that lower ex post costs hinder the incentive for agents to
participate ex ante (to provide liquidity). In summary, we have the following result.
Result 5. When both the demand and supply of liquidity are endogenous, lowering the cost of spot
participation can reduce market liquidity by discouraging agents to participate ex ante.
This result re°ects the negative liquidity externality when agents withdraw from the market. We
discuss this externality in the next section.
6 Externality and Welfare of Liquidity
In this section, we consider the welfare implications of the externality from trading. We measure
an agent's welfare by his certainty equivalence gain from participating in the market. Using the
value functions of market makers and traders in (19), we can de¯ne the certainty equivalence gain
as CEi ´ ¡ 1
® ln Ji
JNP , for i = m;n, where JNP = E[Jn
NP] is the value function of an agent who never
24participates. Since all agents are ex ante identical and have the choice of becoming a market maker
or a trader, their ex ante welfare is also identical, which is given by CE ´ maxfCEn;CEmg.
In Figure 8, we plot CE for di®erent values of c (the solid line) when both liquidity demand (±)
and supply (¹) are determined endogenously. In the absence of any externalities, one might expect
the welfare to decrease with c. Figure 8 clearly indicates that the opposite can be true. That is,
when the spot participation cost increases, agents' welfare can actually improve. Indeed, the dashed
line is a horizontal line that marks the CE level at c = 0:6. We see that it is higher than (or equal
to) the CE for all c > 0:13, indicating that agents are better o® at c = 0:6 than at 0:13 < c < 0:6.
This is a surprising result, which arises from the externality generated by those who supply liquidity
by becoming market makers.






Figure 8: Welfare and the cost of spot participation c. The solid line reports the certainty equivalent gain CE
from optimal participation (hence CE=CE
n=CE
m) as a function of spot participation cost c. The horizontal
dashed line marks the level of CE at c = 0:6. The vertical dotted line marks the point of c = 0:281, below which
¹ = 0. The cost to become a market maker is ¯xed at cm = 0:2. Other parameters are set at the following
values: ® = 4, ¾ = 0:25, ¾z = 0:7, ¾" = 1:2, and ¾Y = 0:7.
In order to see how liquidity provision in°uences welfare, we note from Figure 7(a) that the market
structure changes around c = 0:281|the population of market makers increases steeply from zero to
about 0.17 as c increases from slightly below 0:281 to slight above. The increase in the population of
market makers increases the liquidity supply in the market, which enhances the welfare of all agents
as Figure 8 demonstrates. Moreover, the point at which ¹ becomes positive (c = 0:281) coincides
with the point at which the welfare of agents starts to increase with c.
Note that at c = 0:281, the market structure changes from a trader market to a dealer market.
Although the population of market makers increases drastically from zero to 0.17, the change in
the welfare level of the economy is smooth at this point. The continuity in welfare, however, does
not imply that the change in market structure is immaterial. Figure 8 demonstrates a clear regime
shift at this point|there is a discrete change in the relation between welfare and primitives of the
economy such as the cost of spot participation. In particular, when c < 0:281, decreasing the spot
participation cost does not change the market structure (¹ remains 0) and always improves welfare.
When c > 0:281, however, decreasing the spot participation cost reduces ex ante liquidity provision
25and hence decreases welfare. Such change in the properties of the market has important policy
implications, which we discuss in Section 7. We summarize this result as follows:
Result 6. When both the demand and the supply of liquidity are determined endogenously, lowering
the cost of spot participation can have the adverse e®ect of reducing welfare.
This result suggests that in the presence of trading externality, the market equilibrium|in which
agents optimally choose whether and when to enter the market|can be suboptimal. In particular,
the equilibrium supply of liquidity can be ine±cient. In order to illustrate this point, we show
that agents' welfare in the market equilibrium can be improved by simply forcing agents to pay the
participation cost to be in the market. The forced participation can be carried out either ex ante
or on the spot. In the former case all agents are forced to pay cost cm and become market makers
while in the latter case all traders are forced to pay cost c to participate in the market on the spot.
We consider these two cases separately.
We de¯ne the \welfare gain under forced participation" as the di®erence between the welfare
levels in the equilibrium under forced participation and under optimal participation,
G ´ CEFP ¡ CE; (25)
where CEFP is de¯ned as the CE in the forced participation equilibrium.
We ¯rst consider the case of forced ex ante participation. Figure 9(a) reports the welfare gain
G in this case. When c is very small, forcing agents to pay the high cost cm, which is set at 0:2, is
clearly ine±cient and reduces welfare. Interestingly, for the range of 0:13 < c < 0:20, the gain G > 0,
indicating that forcing all agents to pay cost cm can improve welfare, even though all agents have the
option to pay a lower cost c in the spot market in the competitive equilibrium. The improvement in
welfare re°ects the fact that each agent's participation brings additional liquidity to the market and
thus improves the welfare of others. In the competitive market equilibrium, an agent is not su±ciently
compensated for such a social bene¯t. Thus, their individual decisions can be di®erent from what
is socially optimal. In the equilibrium under forced participation, enough gains are generated to be
shared equally among all agents, which can outweigh the extra costs paid. In summary, we have the
following result.
Result 7. Individual participation choices can lead to insu±cient liquidity supply in the market and
the resulting welfare loss can outweigh total participation costs.
We now consider the case of forced spot participation, in which all traders pay cost c to participate,
independent of their trading needs. We ¯rst consider the welfare gain, holding the population of
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Figure 9: The welfare improvement of forced participation. The ¯gure reports the change in the certainty
equivalent wealth G as a function of spot participation cost c. Panel (a) reports the case of ex ante intervention,
in which all agents are forced to pay the ex ante cost cm. Panel (b) and (c) report the case of spot intervention,
in which all potential traders are forced to pay the spot cost c. The forced participation comes as a surprise
in Panel (b) and is fully anticipated in Panel (c). The vertical dotted lines mark the point of c = 0:281, below
which ¹ = 0. The cost to become a market maker is ¯xed at cm = 0:2. Other parameters are set at the following
values: ® = 4, ¾ = 0:25, ¾z = 0:7, ¾" = 1:2, and ¾Y = 0:7.
market makers the same as that under the competitive equilibrium. This is equivalent to assuming
that the forced participation is unanticipated so that agents don't adjust their decisions to become
market makers in the ¯rst place. Figure 9(b) shows the welfare gain in this situation.15 For c < 0:057,
agents optimally choose to always participate as traders, yielding the same outcome as in the forced
participation equilibrium. Hence G = 0. For c ranges from 0.057 to 0:295, forced spot participation
improves welfare. From Figure 7(a), the equilibrium population of market makers is small for this
range of c. Forcing spot participation improves market liquidity signi¯cantly, leading to the welfare
gain.
In the case of forced spot participation, if agents are allowed to adjust their ex ante participation
decisions in anticipation of forced participation, their welfare will be further increased. In particular,
they rationally choose to pay the spot cost c for all c < cm and to pay the ex ante cost cm for
all c > cm. Thus, the welfare gain G is simply the maximum of the G's in Figures 9(a) and 9(b),
which is given in Figure 9(c). In this case, the gain G is always positive, indicating that forced spot
participation always improves social welfare when all agents rationally anticipate the policy. The
gain is driven mainly by the increased ex ante liquidity provision. Thus, we have the following result:
Result 8. Forcing agents to participate in the market can improve social welfare, especially if it
encourages ex ante liquidity provision.
Despite the simplicity of our setting, the mechanism we have identi¯ed for a market failure in
coordinating costly liquidity provision is rather general: Each agent not only bene¯ts from his own
15In this situation, the ex ante welfare of market makers and traders are no longer the same. G is then de¯ned as
the population weighted average of their ex ante welfare measured in certainty equivalence.
27trades but also brings liquidity to the market. Bearing the full cost alone, each agent may not be able
to e±ciently internalize the bene¯t he creates for the market. As a result, the traders' participation
decisions, while optimal at the individual level, may well be socially sub-optimal.
It is well recognized in the literature that markets may not always achieve e±cient outcomes when
frictions are present. For example, Diamond (1982) examines markets in which trading is conducted
through a search process and shows that the resulting equilibrium can be ine±cient. Pagano (1989)
and Allen and Gale (1994) show the possibility of Pareto-dominated equilibria in markets with ex
ante participation costs. Our results are di®erent in nature. These papers focus on the multiplicity
of equilibria and the Pareto ine±ciency of some of these equilibria relative to others. We focus on the
equilibrium that is not dominated and our results are on its ine±ciency (as stated in Section 3.4, we
ignore the dominated equilibrium). Our welfare comparison is between equilibrium under di®erent
primitives such as c and cm (i.e., between di®erent economies), not between di®erent equilibria of a
given economy.
7 Policy Implications
Liquidity in the market, especially at the time of crises, has been an important issue for regulators
and policy makers. For example, during unusual times, such as the LTCM crisis in 1998, the days
around Y2K, the time after 9.11, and the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis, the Federal Reserve Bank
took direct actions to ensure su±cient level of liquidity in the market when needed. These actions
range from the coordination of major dealers in providing liquidity (e.g., for the LTCM crises) to
the direct injection of liquidity (e.g., for Y2Y, 9.11 and the sub-prime crisis). The current surge of
the hedge fund industry also raises new challenges. On the one hand, facing fewer constraints than
most existing ¯nancial intermediaries, hedge funds often play the role of market makers and supply
liquidity. On the other hand, the risk taking nature of their business tends to put hedge funds in
volatile situations especially when crises hit. There are increasing concerns about their impact on
market stability if they become liquidity constrained themselves. Tightening margins and restricting
exposures of major banks to hedge funds have been proposed as preventive measures to restrain
potential liquidity crunches.
Arguments have been presented both for and against these actions and proposals. But a com-
prehensive theoretical foundation for these policy discussions remains lacking. Although a detailed
policy discussion is not the focus of this paper, our model nonetheless provides a useful framework
to consider the determinants of market liquidity and to examine the welfare impact of certain inter-
vention policies. A full analysis of the model's policy implications is beyond the scope of this paper,
28our discussion below is only exploratory.
Our theory predicts that lowering the cost of ex ante participation in general increases liquidity
supply and welfare. Therefore, policies that lower the entry cost and restrictions for dealers/market
makers are welfare improving. To the extent that hedge funds perform the market making role,
relaxing their margin constraints may decrease the cost for them to maintain their constant presence
and improve market liquidity. On the other hand, we ¯nd that lowering the cost of spot participation
does not necessarily increase liquidity supply and welfare, especially if it is anticipated by market
participants. This suggests that an anticipated government policy of relaxing margin constraints or
injecting liquidity during crises is not always optimal. It tends to reduce the incentive for agents to
establish themselves as market makers and thus lowers the level of liquidity supplied by the market.16
Our discussion above is based on the interpretation of spot liquidity injection as lowing the cost
of spot participation to lure those who are holding back to jump in. In the time of crisis, however,
liquidity injection often takes the form of relaxing capital constraints for existing market makers.
Although in our model capital plays no explicit role in agents' behavior, as discussed in Section 2.E,
the population of market makers plays the same role as the total amount of capital in the market
in terms of a®ecting the overall risk taking capacity. From this perspective, increasing capital is
equivalent to adding more market makers ex post, which can reduce the pro¯t for existing market
makers. This e®ect is similar to that of lowering the spot participation cost in the model, which
encourages traders with o®setting trading needs to provide liquidity and to compete away the pro¯t
for existing market makers. In both cases, the new liquidity reduces the ex ante incentive to become
a market maker (or to stock capital).
If, however, the capital is targeted directly at the existing market makers, then it becomes a
subsidy to them. The resulting impact can be complex, depending on factors such as how the capital
is raised and distributed. Suppose, for example, that the capital is distributed evenly among market
makers free of charge. Then, this liquidity insurance amounts to a government handout. It will
induce more agents to become market makers. Of course, this subsidy needs to be paid, say, through
an ex ante tax over all agents. The net e®ect will depend on the trade o® between the gain from more
market makers (and more liquidity) and the cost to induce them. Suppose, however, the liquidity is
o®ered to the market makers through a market mechanism, like the new credit facilities the U.S. Fed
o®ered to banks and security ¯rms during the current credit crisis. We then face the same situation
16Before Y2K, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York sold loan options to depository institutions and Treasury bond
dealers (Special Liquidity Facility and Special Financing Facility) in order to guarantee su±cient liquidity during the
Y2K transition. This is in the spirit of a state-contingent liquidity injection considered here. Interested readers are
referred to Sundaresan and Wang (2006) for a more detailed account of the Y2K options and the market behavior
during that time.
29in which market makers choose to buy ine±cient amount of liquidity.
Our ¯ndings by no means rule out the possibility of positive intervention during crises. If instead,
the government can coordinate traders to participate in the market in the event of severe liquidity
shortage, liquidity and welfare can be improved under certain circumstances.17 In general, our theory
suggests that mechanisms that resemble \forced spot participation" (e.g., coordination of trading),
especially if they are anticipated by the market, are better at improving liquidity than those that
resemble \subsidized spot participation" (e.g., direct injection of liquidity or relaxation of ex post
margin constraints). The reason is that agents do not expect to gain by waiting for spot participation,
and hence the anticipation of future interventions does not hinder their ex ante liquidity provision
motive.
Our analysis also shows that policy implications can be di®erent under di®erent market structures.
For example, as shown in Figure 8, while lowering the spot participation cost can improve welfare in
a trader market (when c < 0:281), it decreases welfare in a dealer market (when c ¸ 0:281).
8 Related Literature
The literature on liquidity and its impact on the securities market is extensive. In this section, we
discuss those work that are closest to this paper. Most of the previous work has focused on the
supply of liquidity, taking its demand as exogenous. The theory on market microstructure, which
studies the actual trading process, starts with an exogenous order °ow process and examines how
market makers provide liquidity by accommodating order imbalances (e.g., Ho and Stoll (1980), Stoll
(1985), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Kyle (1985)). Grossman and Miller (1988) further point
out that it is costly for market makers to maintain market presence. They analyze how these costs
determine the level of liquidity supply and its impact on prices under exogenous liquidity shocks. In
this paper, we show that the same costs actually give rise to the need for liquidity in the ¯rst place.
By explicitly modeling the endogenous need for liquidity, we obtain important insights on how it
behaves, how it interacts with the supply of liquidity in equilibrium, and how liquidity a®ects prices
and welfare.
Our paper expands the work of Grossman and Miller (1988), Pagano (1989) and Allen and Gale
(1994). By observing that the same participation cost causes the need for liquidity in the ¯rst place,
we fully endogenize the liquidity need (or order imbalance). Instead of relying on exogenous liquidity
shocks at the aggregate level, we show how liquidity need arises from purely idiosyncratic shocks.
This allows us to gain additional insights into its properties, which can be quite di®erent from those
17During the LTCM crisis, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York facilitated the formation of a consortium of
investment banks which provided the new capital to prevent the hedge fund from collapsing.
30assumed for exogenous liquidity shocks. It also allows us to examine how the demand and supply of
liquidity interact with each other in equilibrium, leading to di®erent market structures and di®erent
relations between liquidity and price behavior. It further allows us to study how liquidity a®ects
welfare.
The model we use shares many features with the model of Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2004), who
consider the impact of ¯xed transactions costs on trading volume and the level of asset prices. The
main di®erence is that we focus on the possible imbalance in liquidity needs and its impact on prices
while they do not. They allow the cost to be allocated endogenously so that the trades of di®erent
market participants are always synchronized in equilibrium and there is no order imbalance and net
liquidity need. As we show in this paper, it is the order imbalance that leads to changes in liquidity
needs and instability in asset prices.
A closely related paper is Huang and Wang (2007), which uses a similar setting to arrive at
endogenous liquidity need. The main di®erences are two-fold. In Huang and Wang (2007), the
supply of liquidity is taken as given while analyzing the demand for liquidity. In this paper, we also
endogenize the supply of liquidity. As we have shown, the interaction between the two when both
are endogenous, has a fundamental in°uence on the behavior of liquidity in the market. Second,
Huang and Wang (2007) focuses on the impact of liquidity on prices. In this paper, we focus on
market structure, welfare and policy implications concerning liquidity. It is also for this purpose that
we have to endogenize liquidity supply in a uni¯ed setting. At a more technical level, the aggregate
risk is assumed to be positive and constant in Huang and Wang (2007). This is needed in modeling
markets with positively supplies such as the equity market. For our purpose, we do not need this
restrictive assumption, which simpli¯es the analysis.
In our model, costs to transact in the market take the simple form of participation costs. The
organization of the market still takes the form of a centralized exchange. This is a reasonable
description for major securities markets, such as the New York Stock Exchange or Chicago Mercantile
Exchange, but less so for others, such as over-the-counter (OTC) markets for long term options and
corporate bonds. For these OTC markets, costs to transact may take di®erent forms. For example,
Du±e, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005) solve for equilibrium prices in an OTC market with search
and bargaining among market participants.18
Our paper is also related to a growing literature that studies the welfare implications of di®erent
market structures. Brusco and Jackson (1999) show that competitive ex post trading reduces the
incentive for agents to participate ex ante to become market makers and can lead to Pareto inef-
18The literature that utilizes the search framework to model ¯nancial market transactions include Rubinstein and
Wolinsky (1987), Gale (1987), and Vayanos and Wang (2007), among others.
31¯ciency. They argue that giving market makers ex post market power can increase their ex ante
participation and improve social welfare.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that frictions such as participation costs can induce imbalances in agents'
trades even when their trading needs are perfectly matched. Each trader, when arriving at the
market, faces only a partial demand/supply of the asset. The mismatch in the timing and the size
of trades creates temporary order imbalance and the need for liquidity, which causes asset prices to
deviate from the fundamentals. By endogenously determine both the demand and supply of liquidity,
we are able to show that purely idiosyncratic liquidity shocks can a®ect prices, introducing additional
price volatility. The price deviations always amplify the price impact of aggregate shocks, and is of
large sizes whenever they occur, leading to fat tails in returns.
Moreover, we ¯nd that traders optimally refrain from participating in less liquid market, leading
to lower observed liquidity needs. As a result, prices do not necessarily exhibit higher liquidity impact
or higher volatility in less liquid markets, rendering it necessary to incorporate trading volume into
measures of market liquidity.
Finally, we show that partial participation in the market by a subset of traders can have important
welfare implications. In particular, the withdrawal of a subset of traders from the market reduces
market liquidity, which further reduces the incentive for others to participate in the market. The
fact that participating agents cannot fully internalize the bene¯t from their liquidity provision leads
to sub-optimal provision of liquidity despite the optimizing behavior at the individual level.
This ine±ciency in the market mechanism leaves room for policy intervention. However, the
design of e±cient intervention is far from obvious as it a®ects the demand and supply of liquidity in
intricate ways. For example, lowering the cost of supplying liquidity on the spot (e.g., through direct
injection of liquidity or relaxation of ex post margin constraints) can decrease welfare by reducing
the pro¯t opportunities for market makers and thus the ex ante incentive for them to be there. On
the other hand, forcing more liquidity supply (e.g., through coordination of market participants)
during times of crises can improve welfare. The key distinction is that agents do not expect to be
subsidized during crises, and hence the anticipation of future interventions does not hinder their ex
ante incentive to supply liquidity.
32A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Participating agent i maximizes his expected utility over his terminal wealth Wi
2, de¯ned in (6).









The optimal holding is obtained by solving the ¯rst order condition with respect to µi
1:
µi
1 = ¡P1=(®¾2) ¡ Y ¡ ¸iZ; i = a;b: (A2)
Given initial holding µi







1) = 0 (A3)
Substituting µi
1 into (A2) and the de¯nition of ± in (8) yields the equilibrium price P1. The optimal
holding in the proposition is obtained by substituting the equilibrium price P1 back into (A2).
Proof of Proposition 2
To calculate Ji
P, we substitute µi
0 = 0, the equilibrium P1, and µi
1 into (A1) and integrate over Z
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NP into (13) yields the trading gain g(¢). Clearly, Ji
P >Ji
NP i® gi(¢)>0.
Proof of Proposition 3
For brevity, we denote gi(±) ´ gi(±;Y;X). We prove the result when X and Y have the same sign.
The case of di®erent signs can be proved by switching the indexes a and b.
Lemma A.1. The gains ga(±) strictly decreases with ± and gb(±) strictly increases with ±.










; di ´ 1¡k+k(1¡¸i±)2: (A6)
Since k > 0, di > 0, ± < 1, and ¸a = ¡¸b = 1, we have @ga=@± < 0 and @gb=@± > 0. QED.




(kY + ¸iX)2 ¡
1
2®
ln(1¡k) ¡ c; i = a;b:
Whenever X has the same sign as Y , we have ga(0) ¸ gb(0). QED.
From Lemma A.2, the state space has 3 regions, (A) 0¸ga(0)¸gb(0), (B) ga(0)¸gb(0)¸0, and
(C) ga(0) > 0 > gb(0), which correspond to the three cases in the proposition. In region A, we can
show that !a=!b=0 is the unique equilibrium. If instead !a>!b, then ±>0 and ga(±)<ga(0)·0
from Lemma A.1 and the condition for region A. Hence, some group-a traders will exit and !a
decreases. Similarly, if !a <!b, then ± <0 and gb(±)<gb(0)·0. Group-b traders will exit and !b
decreases. Hence, in equilibrium, !a=!b and ± = 0. Since both gi(0)·0, !a=!b=0 is the unique
equilibrium. Similarly, in region B, we can show that !a=!b=1 and ± = 0 is the unique equilibrium.
Note that ga(0) = gb(0) = 0 is included in both regions A and B. In fact, any !a = !b 2 [0;1] is a
solution. We do not separate out this case for conciseness, as it occurs only for a single realization
of X and Y .
In region C, we consider three subcases based on gi(¹ ±), where ¹ ± ´ (1¡¹)=(1+¹) is the maximum
possible ± in (8) (since !a and !b are bounded in [0;1]).
(i) If ga(¹ ±)>0>gb(¹ ±), then Lemma A.1 yields ga(±)¸ga(¹ ±)>0>gb(¹ ±)¸gb(±) for any feasible ±.
Thus, !a=1 and !b=0 is the unique equilibrium, and ±=¹ ±.
(ii) If ga(¹ ±) > 0 and gb(¹ ±) > 0, then there exists a unique sb 2 (0; ¹ ±) that solves gb(sb) = 0.
(Lemma A.1 and gb(0)<0 in region C.) Since ga(±)¸ga(¹ ±)¸0 for any feasible ±, we always have




2 (1+sb) , then for any !b > ^ !b, ± <sb and gb(±)<gb(sb)=0,
some group-b will stop participating and !b decreases. For any !b<^ !b, ±>sb and gb(±)>gb(sb)=0,
and more group-b will participate and !b increases. Hence, !a=1, !b= ^ !b 2 [0;1), and ±=sb is the
unique equilibrium.
(iii) If ga(¹ ±) · 0, there exists a unique sa 2 (0; ¹ ±] that solves ga(sa) = 0. If gb(sa) · 0, then
a similar argument to case (ii) shows that !a = ^ !a ´
¹sa
1¡¹
2 (1¡sa) 2 (0;1] and !b = 0 is the unique
equilibrium and ± =sa. If gb(sa)>0, there exists a unique sb 2(0;sa) that solves gb(sb)=0. Since
ga(sb)>ga(sa)=0, !a=1, !b=^ !b 2 [0;1), and ±=sb is the unique equilibrium.
We now consider the case of ¹ = 0. First, !a = !b = 0 is always an equilibrium. Assume the
equilibrium belief is !a = 0, then Jb
P = Jb
NP e®c < Jb
NP and !b = 0 is the only equilibrium outcome.
Similarly, a belief of !b =0 leads to a unique equilibrium of !a =0. Second, in the above positive
participation equilibrium, since kY +X can be arbitrarily large, ga(0) > 0 is always possible. Hence,
region A does not cover the full state space and we have !a =1 for at least some realizations of X
and Y . Whenever !a =1, the trading gain ga ¸0. Since ga =0 when !a =!b =0, the equilibrium
34without participation is always Pareto dominated by the one with participation.
Proof of Lemma 1




Also, we show that Jm(¹;c)·Jn(¹;c)·Jm(¹;0), where the ¯rst inequality is because of (19) and
the fact that Ji
P ·maxfJi
P;Ji
NPg, and the second inequality is because Jm(¹;0)=Jn(¹;0)>Jn(¹;c)
for any c·0. Hence, there exists a unique · 2 [0;c] such that Jm(¹;·)=Jn(¹;c).












Given (A7), we only need to calculate @Jm=@¹ and @Jn=@¹ in order to sign @·=@¹.
Following the proof of Proposition 3, we separate the state space (X;Y ) into 5 regions: (A)
!a=!b=0, (B) !a=!b=1, (C1) !a=1, !b=0, (C2) !a 2 (0;1), !b=0, and (C3) !a=1, !b 2 (0;1).
Regions A and B are the same as those in Proposition 3, and combining regions C1, C2 and C3 yields
region C. Let Gi ´ Ji
P ¡ Ji
NP, then Gi = Ji
NP(e¡®gi(±) ¡ 1), where gi(±) ´ gi(¢) in (14). Thus, Gi>0
i® gi>0, which occurs only if !i=1. Hence, we can write Jn(¢) as JNP plus the gains from trading














where the factor 1
2 re°ects averaging over realizations of ¸i and the factor 4 re°ects the symmetric
gain in the four quadrants while we focusing only on the X>0;Y >0 quadrant.
To calculate @Jn(¹;c)=@¹, note that Ji
NP is clearly independent of ¹. Since gi(¢) depends on ¹
only through ±, so does Gi. Moreover, in regions A and B, ±=0 and is clearly independent of ¹. In
regions C2 and C3, ± solves either ga(±)=0 or gb(±)=0 and is also independent of ¹. Therefore, Gi












Hence the second term is nonzero only in region C1. To calculate the ¯rst term, note that N =
fB;C1;C3g for agent a. From the proof of Proposition 3, the boundary No is ga(±) = 0. Hence,
Ga(No)=0. For agent b, N =fBg and the boundary is gb(0)=0, which is independent of ¹. Hence,
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@± >0 (from Lemma A.1) and @¹ ±
@¹ <0
(from the de¯nition of ¹ ±).
The condition for the strict inequality can be derived in three steps. First, given the strict
negativity of @Gb
@¹ , the inequality is strict i® there exists a region C1. Second, there exists a region C1
in which ga(¹ ±)>0>gb(¹ ±) i® gb
2<c, where gb
2 is in (A13d). We plug ¹ ± into (14) to derive the following
trading gains in region C1,
ga(¹ ±) = ga
1(X + kY )2 + ga
















gb(¹ ±) = gb
1(X ¡ kY )2 + gb
















To prove this second step, note that if gb
2 ¸ c, then gb(¹ ±) ¸ 0 and there does not exist region C1.
On the other hand, if gb
2<c, gb(¹ ±)<0 for X close enough to kY , while it is always possible to ¯nd
su±ciently large X + kY such that ga(¹ ±)>0. Hence, there always exists a region C1. Third, gb
2<c
i® ¹>¹, de¯ned in (20). If ¹ 2 (0;1), the result holds since ¹ solves gb
2=c and gb
2 strictly decreases
in ¹. If ¹=0, then gb
2(0)·c. Hence, for any ¹>¹=0, gb
2<gb
2(0)·c, proving the result. Similarly, if
¹=1, the result holds since for any ¹<¹=1, gb
2>gb
2(1)¸c.
Proof of Proposition 4
If cm < cm ´ ·(1), then for any ¹ · 1, we have cm < ·(¹) by Lemma 1. Hence, Jm(¹;cm) >
Jm(¹;·(¹))=Jn(¹;c); where the equality is the de¯nition of ·(¹). Thus, equilibrium is reached only
when ¹=1. Similarly, if cm>cm ´ ·(0), we have cm>·(¹) and Jm(¹;cm)<Jm(¹;·(¹))=Jn(¹;c)
for any ¹¸0, and ¹=0 is the unique equilibrium.
If cm = cm ´ ·(0), we have ·(0) = ·(¹) for any ¹ 2 [0;¹] and ·(0) > ·(¹) for any ¹ > ¹
from Lemma 1. At any ¹ > ¹, Jm(¹;cm) = Jm(¹;·(0)) < Jm(¹;·(¹)) = Jn(¹;c), and ¹ decreases
36in equilibrium. At any ¹ 2 [0;¹], Jm(¹;cm) = Jm(¹;·(0)) = Jm(¹;·(¹)) = Jn(¹;c). Hence, any
¹ 2 [0;¹] is an equilibrium. As a special case, if ¹=0, then ¹=0.
If cm · cm < cm, we can show that ¹ = ·¡1(cm) is the unique equilibrium. Since cm < cm =
·(0) = ·(¹), we have ·¡1(cm) > ¹ from Lemma 1. For any ¹ < ·¡1(cm), we have ·(¹) > cm and
Jm(¹;cm)>Jm(¹;·(¹))=Jn(¹;c): Hence, ¹ increases in equilibrium. Similarly, for any ¹>·¡1(cm),
we have ·(¹)<cm and Jm(¹;cm)<Jm(¹;·(¹))=Jn(¹;c) and ¹ decreases in equilibrium. As a result,
¹=·¡1(cm) is the unique equilibrium.
We now derive the speed of decrease in optimal ¹ when ¹ = 0, especially for small ¹. Since
¹=·¡1(cm) in this case, we have @¹=@cm=1=(@·=@¹). From (A12), both the size of region C1 and
the value of @Gb=@¹ in region C1 a®ect @·=@¹.
We ¯rst bound the size of region C1. From (20), ¹=0 requires gb















X;Y >0, the condition ga(¹ ±)>0>gb(¹ ±) (for region C1) requires
X>¡kY + ga
3 and kY ¡ gb
3<X<kY + gb
3; (A14)
which requires Y > 1
2k(ga
3 ¡ gb
3). From (A13), when ¹ ! 0, ga
3 =O(1=¹) and gb
3=O(1). Hence,
PC1 ´ Prob[X;Y 2 C1]<Prob[Y >(ga
3 ¡ gb
3)=(2k)] = 1 ¡ ©[O(1=¹)] = O
³
e¡1=¹2´
gives the size of region C1, where ©(¢) is the cumulative normal density.
Next, we bound the term @Gb













Since gb(¹ ±)<0 in region C1, from (A13), we have 0·gb
1(X¡kY )2·c¡gb
2. Thus, there exists positive
constants F1;F2 such that ¡F1 < @Gb
@¹ <¡F2, and EC1[@Gb
@¹ ] 2 (¡F1 PC1;0). Combining this bound







Proof of Proposition 5
From Proposition 4, when cm<cm, the equilibrium for market makers is unique and ¹>0. Taking




































1 ¡ k + k(1 ¡ ¸i±)2 ; i = a;b:
37Given Proposition 3 and the symmetry between group-a and -b traders, we have
±(X;Y ) = ±(¡X;¡Y ) = ¡±(X;¡Y ) = ¡±(¡X;Y ):
At µi
0 = 0, Ji
P(X;Y ) = Ji
P(¡X;¡Y ) and Di
P(X;Y ) = ¡Di























0=0=0. Hence, P0=0 and µi
0=0 is the unique equilibrium.
When cm>cm, from Proposition 4, ¹=0 is the unique equilibrium. From Proposition 3, we know
that the autarky equilibrium for traders with !a = !b = 0 is Pareto dominated by the equilibrium
with participation. In the positive participation equilibrium, ± is still well de¯ned, and all the above
derivation applies. Hence, P0=0 and µi
0=0 is still the equilibrium.
When cm=cm, from Proposition 4, there are multiple equilibria for ¹ 2 [0;¹) when ¹>0. From
the proof of Lemma 1, we know that ¹·¹ is the necessary and su±cient condition for gb
2¸c, which is
the necessary and su±cient condition to rule out the existence of region C1. From (A10) and (A11),
we see that the utility for both traders and market makers is independent of ¹ in the absence of
region C1, which coincides with the above condition for multiple equilibria. Hence, even though there
are multiple equilibria for ¹ when cm=cm, the welfare level remains constant across these equilibria.
Similar to the cm>cm case, if ¹=0, there exist an additional autarky equilibrium, which is Pareto
dominated by all the positive participation equilibria.
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